Turkiye and NATO: A Military Alliance Under the Shadow of Strategic Distrust

Türkiye and NATO: A Military Alliance Under the Shadow of Strategic Distrust

Membership in a military alliance does not necessarily imply complete political, security or strategic alignment among its members. At times, countries belonging to the same collective defence structure pursue entirely different objectives and hold fundamentally different perceptions of security and national interests regarding key regional and international issues. The relationship between Türkiye and NATO is a notable example of this reality.

Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952. During the Cold War, owing to its geographical position and military significance along the Soviet Union’s southern borders, it occupied a particularly important position within the Western defence structure. However, political and security developments over recent decades, particularly Ankara’s increasingly independent foreign policy, its disagreements with the United States and several European NATO members, and the expansion of its military relations with Russia, have raised important questions about the future of its membership. The central issue is not merely the differences between these two allies. Rather, the focus should be on whether Türkiye still perceives NATO membership in the same strategic terms as it did in the past, and whether its alliance partners continue to regard Türkiye as a security partner with the same level of trust.

Türkiye’s accession to NATO in 1952 was primarily a response to the post-Second World War security environment and Ankara’s concerns about the growing influence of the Soviet Union.

At that time, NATO membership meant a guarantee of collective defence, access to Western military cooperation and a firm position within the European and American security framework for Türkiye.

However, the end of the Cold War transformed the nature of this relationship. The common Soviet threat disappeared, and Türkiye gradually sought to align its foreign policy more closely with its regional interests and national objectives.

This shift did not mean abandoning NATO. Rather, it reflected Ankara’s desire to retain the benefits of membership while gaining greater independence in political and military decision-making.

Consequently, Türkiye’s relationship with NATO gradually evolved from cooperation based primarily on shared security concerns into a more complex relationship in which national interests, regional rivalries and bargaining power assumed greater importance.

One of the most significant points of contention between Türkiye and NATO is Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defence system.

From the perspective of the United States in particular, this decision was not an ordinary arms purchase. The deployment of such an advanced Russian defence system in a NATO member state raised concerns about equipment compatibility, the security of military information and the potential transfer of sensitive data.

The consequences of this decision were also substantial. The United States removed Türkiye from the F-35 fighter jet programme and imposed sanctions on the Turkish defence industry.

Ankara, for its part, justified the purchase by referring to its defence requirements and the difficulties it had encountered in obtaining certain alternative systems from Western suppliers. Nevertheless, the central question remains: how can a country belong to a collective defence treaty while simultaneously cooperating with a strategic rival in one of the most sensitive areas of military security? This is a clear indication of Türkiye’s growing military independence and its declining coordination with certain Western partners.

Türkiye’s policy in Syria is among the most complicated aspects of Ankara’s relations with its Western allies.

Türkiye considers combating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and preventing the expansion of its armed structures to be among its national security priorities.

By contrast, the United States maintains military cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against ISIS, an organisation that Türkiye considers a security threat because of its links to the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

This disagreement is not merely a matter of differing assessments of armed groups. It reflects a fundamental divergence in how two NATO members define threats and prioritise their security interests.

Türkiye’s support for armed Syrian groups, particularly the Syrian National Army (SNA), has been criticised by human rights organisations. Documented reports of human rights violations committed by certain groups supported by Ankara raise questions about Türkiye’s political and military responsibility in territories under their control.

A significant contradiction lies at the heart of this issue: on the one hand, Türkiye declares that combating terrorism is one of the fundamental principles of its security policy; on the other, it cooperates with armed groups whose conduct has, at times, prompted serious human rights criticism.

Therefore, an assessment of Türkiye’s security policy should not be based solely on the labels governments attach to armed groups. Instead, the actual conduct of these groups, the nature of state support and the consequences of their actions for civilian populations must be examined.

One of the most important questions when considering Türkiye’s future is its longstanding interest in the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.

Türkiye's interest in nuclear technology dates back to the early years of its nuclear development. In 1956, it established the Atomic Energy Commission as part of its efforts to develop nuclear science and technology. However, civilian nuclear development must be distinguished from ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons.

Historical documents indicate that the possibility of developing an independent nuclear weapons capability had already attracted the attention of certain Turkish officials by the mid-1960s. A particularly significant document is a classified report sent by the US Embassy in Ankara to Washington on 6 October 1966. According to the report, officials at Türkiye’s General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration had reportedly been asked to cooperate with General Refik Tulga and Professor Ömer İnönü in exploring the possibility of developing an atomic bomb.

The report also referred to Türkiye’s interest in nuclear reactors, uranium exploration and the negotiations surrounding international safeguards for nuclear activities. Although the American ambassador expressed reservations about whether these discussions would lead to an actual weapons programme, the document demonstrates that the nuclear weapons option had already entered the strategic considerations of certain Turkish officials.

Three distinct dimensions must therefore be distinguished:

First, the development of civilian nuclear technology; second, the acquisition of potential technical and industrial capabilities that could enable the development of nuclear weapons; and third, the political decision and practical implementation of nuclear bomb production.

At present, there is no credible evidence that Türkiye has built a nuclear bomb or acquired an operational capability to produce one. Nevertheless, its longstanding interest in the nuclear weapons option and the strategic motivations behind the pursuit of greater nuclear autonomy remain important subjects in international security research.

From NATO’s perspective, any step taken by Türkiye towards independently developing nuclear weapons could have far-reaching implications for the alliance’s nuclear deterrence structure and the balance of power in the Middle East.

This is particularly significant in a region where Iran’s nuclear issue, Israel’s security and strategic competition among regional powers remain central international concerns.

A common mistake in international relations analysis is to equate formal membership in an alliance with unconditional trust among its members. NATO operates on the basis of consensus. Therefore, Türkiye, like other members, has the right to participate in the organisation’s major decisions and to withhold its agreement.

Ankara has repeatedly used this position to strengthen its bargaining power, including during negotiations over NATO enlargement and the accession of Finland and Sweden.

Recent academic studies indicate that Türkiye’s threats to exercise its veto have often formed part of Ankara’s negotiating strategy to obtain concessions in other areas.

Legally, such conduct falls within NATO’s decision-making mechanism. Politically, however, it can undermine mutual trust among alliance members.

In practice, Türkiye seeks to benefit from NATO membership without feeling obliged to align all its regional and international decisions with the priorities of Washington and its European allies.

This approach can be described as a form of strategic balancing and an effort to increase strategic autonomy.

6. Does the West Really Want Türkiye to Leave NATO?

This question is becoming one of the most sensitive aspects of the debate.

In certain Western political and media circles, calls have emerged to limit Türkiye’s influence or even remove it from NATO. Israel openly called for Türkiye’s expulsion from the alliance in 2024. Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish between statements made by individual political figures and media outlets and the official collective policy of NATO member states.

The North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for the compulsory expulsion of a member state. Article 13 of the treaty allows a member to withdraw voluntarily after giving one year’s notice. Therefore, expelling Türkiye from NATO is neither a simple administrative decision nor an action that can be implemented solely through the will of one or several countries.

On the other hand, Türkiye’s geographical position, its control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles under the Montreux Convention, its military presence in the Black Sea, its proximity to the Middle East and its large armed forces make it an important actor in NATO’s security calculations.

Consequently, the costs of Türkiye’s departure from the alliance must be taken into account in the West’s strategic considerations, even if political and security disagreements between Ankara and certain alliance partners intensify.

The answer to this question depends on how we define withdrawal. Formal departure from a military alliance is different from a reduction in practical cooperation, political distancing or the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. Even without formally leaving NATO, Türkiye may disagree with other members on certain security issues, expand its bilateral partnerships and seek new military partners. It may also make decisions contrary to the preferences of certain NATO members on issues it considers directly related to its national interests.

This situation can be understood as a form of autonomy within an alliance: membership in a security structure is maintained while efforts are made to broaden the scope of independent action in foreign policy. However, the continuation of this arrangement depends on mutual tolerance, shared interests and the ability of both sides to manage their disagreements.

If these disagreements extend beyond political negotiations and develop into prolonged conflicts in the defence and intelligence sectors, the relationship between Türkiye and NATO could also undergo a significant transformation.

This relationship cannot be explained simply in terms of friendship or hostility. It is the product of a combination of shared interests, strategic disagreements, security requirements and regional rivalries.

Türkiye needs NATO, but it does not want all its political and security decisions to be aligned with the alliance’s priorities. NATO, in turn, needs Türkiye’s geographical position and military capabilities. However, Ankara’s disagreements with certain alliance partners, particularly over Syria, Russia and arms procurement, have damaged mutual trust.

An especially important point is that a country’s military strength alone cannot guarantee the trust of its allies, just as political disagreements do not necessarily mean the end of a military alliance.

Therefore, Türkiye’s future within NATO should be examined through a fundamental question: Can Ankara reconcile the benefits of NATO membership with the pursuit of an independent foreign policy? And are NATO members prepared to continue accepting a Türkiye with such an approach as a strategic partner?

In international politics, alliances are formed on the basis of shared interests, but their durability depends on the degree of trust, mutual commitment and alignment of interests.

Perhaps the most important question concerning the future of Türkiye and NATO is not whether the country will formally leave the alliance, but whether the nature of their relationship will gradually change, with formal membership remaining intact while their shared understanding of security and strategic interests becomes increasingly complicated.

Author: Gouya Roshan

All rights reserved.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

The first forgiveness we must seek is from our own self

An Enemy May Become a Cause of Good, If God Wills

History Will Not Forget the Silence of Muslim Countries