Saudi Arabia: Years of Anxiety Labeled as “Hostility”

Saudi Arabia: Years of Anxiety Labeled as “Hostility”

As an analyst, I believe it is my duty to examine the facts as objectively and impartially as possible, without any personal bias. However, sometimes the difference between analysis and prediction becomes apparent only with the passage of time.

In 2010, I wrote an article about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s growing influence in the Arab world. On the surface, the article focused on Turkey and Erdoğan; but at a deeper level, it revealed something else: the changing balance of power in the Middle East and the concerns of some countries in the region about Iran’s growing influence and power.

At the time, the exact reasons for this anxiety were not clear to me.

Was it hostility?

Was it fear?

Was it competition?

Or was it something deeper?

Today, sixteen years later, I can define it precisely:

I have been concerned about Iran.

I have been concerned about the circumstances arising from this country becoming a threat to Middle Eastern countries and superpowers.

Of course, no power can remove Iran from the regional balance of power. Iran has a unique geographical position, a large population, abundant energy resources, and thousands of years of history and civilization. It also has access to the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the heart of the Middle East.

In the same article, I had also referred to some seemingly unrelated, and even somewhat unusual, developments: Turkey’s growing influence in Arab countries, Erdoğan’s diplomatic visits, his apparent mediation between Israel and Palestine, and his limited but strategically significant defense of Iran’s nuclear rights... My view at the time was that Erdoğan’s presence had not only increased his personal credibility in the Arab world, but had also had a significant impact on Iran’s political and diplomatic culture.

Returning to today’s subject, it is clear that Erdoğan is not the only actor in this story. Behind the scenes, Arab governments are also making their own decisions. And Iran is at the heart of these decisions.

However, Saudi Arabia’s position in the Arab world is different. Riyadh cannot regard Iran simply as a neighbor. Iran is a potential rival for regional leadership, because it has possessed—and continues to possess—the geographical, political, and military capabilities necessary to influence the Middle Eastern order.

The rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh has been increasing for years and has spread to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Gulf region. This rivalry has gradually evolved from a political dispute into a full-scale geopolitical confrontation. Studies of relations between the two countries describe Saudi Arabia as Iran’s “greatest regional threat.”

Therefore, we should not assume that hostility necessarily means war. This explains Saudi Arabia’s complex strategy toward Iran.

In 2023, with China’s mediation, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic relations. Many see this as a sign that the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh has come to an end.

However, diplomacy should not be confused with friendship. Countries can exchange ambassadors and still remain rivals. They may sign agreements, yet nevertheless prepare for the day of reckoning.

They may smile, but behind that smile lie calculated struggles for power.

Moreover, the events of 2026 also show that strategic rivalry will not simply disappear.

In August of this year, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement in Mecca, stating that an armed attack against one of the member countries would be considered an attack against all. Officials from the three countries emphasized that the agreement did not target any specific country, including Iran.

Nevertheless, analysts do not even need to understand the details of the agreement. They should ask: Why now? Why Mecca? Why Turkey? Why Pakistan? Why this particular moment to sign a joint defense agreement? Why, while Iran has once again become the center of the Middle East’s security crisis? These questions are more important than the official wording of the agreement. Because understanding international politics requires examining not only the rhetoric of governments, but also their actual actions.

But the question remains: What is Saudi Arabia really afraid of? I believe the answer is not simple. Saudi Arabia may not fear an attack from Iran, but it is concerned about Iran’s future power.

These two situations are fundamentally different.

Riyadh may not fear an Iranian attack; but a strong and stable Iran, with a strong economy, normalized relations with its neighbors, and extensive regional influence, is a different story. Sixteen years ago, when I wrote about Israel’s attack on aid ships, these two events could be interpreted separately.

But today, looking back, the connections have become clearer.

Turkey has gained influence in the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia has sought to redefine its position toward Turkey and Iran.

Pakistan has become one of Riyadh’s most important security partners.

And now, the Mecca defense agreement has created a more formal framework for security cooperation among three Muslim powers. The Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) also regards this agreement as a sign of a fundamental geopolitical shift in the region.

However, this does not mean that every action taken by Saudi Arabia should be interpreted as a conspiracy against Iran.

Such an analysis would be far too simplistic.

Saudi Arabia is pursuing its own interests.

Turkey has its own interests.

Pakistan has its own interests.

Therefore, this issue should be taken more seriously.

When three countries with different interests come together to guarantee their security, one must ask what threat or security vacuum has brought them together. The answer may be multifaceted; but Iran certainly plays an important role.

Hostilities do not always begin with shouting.

Perhaps this is the most important lesson from the experience of recent years.

The enemy is not always the one who shouts. Sometimes the enemy is the one who acts quietly.

Sometimes the enemy is not the one who cuts off relations; it is the one who negotiates and, if negotiations fail, forms alliances. And sometimes what appears to be “friendship” from a distance is actually threat management. That is why I now understand that vague feeling I had in 2010 much better.

What I saw was not merely hostility. It was not fear. It was concern; concern that Iran could become a threat to superpowers and some Middle Eastern countries.

And perhaps more than any other country, Saudi Arabia has transformed this concern from a mere feeling into a specific policy. Of course, Iran’s problem is not Saudi Arabia; the real issue is understanding how the game works.

Iran is a powerful country and should never be afraid of Saudi Arabia.

But Saudi Arabia should not be underestimated either.

Fear weakens foreign policy. On the other hand, naivety destroys it.

When Riyadh negotiates with Tehran, it should be taken seriously.

When Riyadh extends a hand of cooperation, it should be welcomed.

But if the same country is simultaneously building new defense and security networks, Iran must also observe and analyze this.

Not with anger. Not with slogans. But with caution. Because real power in foreign policy lies in the ability to recognize the intentions behind actions.

Therefore, Saudi Arabia plays a key role in transforming this concern from a mere feeling into a regional policy.

The question is not whether Saudi Arabia is a friend or an enemy of Iran. The question is whether Riyadh is preparing for a world in which Iran may once again become more powerful than Saudi Arabia itself.

And if we fail to accept this reality, as has happened at many turning points in the history of the region, we may once again find ourselves in a game in which other actors have already placed their pieces on the board.

Gouya Roshan — All rights reserved.