Atatürk’s View of Erdoğan’s Politics

Atatürk’s View of Erdoğan’s Politics

If Atatürk were alive today, he would probably pay more attention to Erdoğan’s achievements than to Erdoğan’s self-presentation. This distinction is extremely important because in politics, what a politician says about a historical figure does not always correspond to what that figure actually left behind.

Erdoğan has known for years that he cannot erase Atatürk from Turkish history. Atatürk was not merely a president or a military commander; he was the founder of the Republic of Turkey and the leader of the party whose name and identity became inseparably linked to republicanism and secularism. Therefore, Erdoğan’s disagreement with Atatürk cannot be reduced to a few statements about personal respect or disrespect. The issue is deeper: Which aspects of Atatürk’s republic does Erdoğan agree with, and which does he seek to change?

To understand this difference, we must turn to Atatürk himself, rather than to the interpretations that today’s politicians offer of him.

Atatürk had a clear position on religion. He did not deny it; on the contrary, in his recorded speeches, he spoke of religion as a matter of conscience and emphasized that religion should not become a tool of politics. The Atatürk Research Center, in explaining the principle of secularism, also emphasizes the separation of religion from the state and the prevention of the political exploitation of religion. In one of his recorded speeches, he even stated: “Religion and faith should never be used as instruments of politics.”

At this point, the comparison with Erdoğan is no longer merely theoretical.

Erdoğan emerged from a political movement rooted in Turkey’s religious conservatism. Unlike the Kemalists, he significantly strengthened the role of religion and religious values in Turkey’s public life. This change was not limited to speeches; it also manifested itself in education, public symbols, and the definition of Turkey’s political identity.

Even in recent years, when the Erdoğan government introduced a new education curriculum, secular critics and educational groups objected to what they saw as an increasing emphasis on religious values and the diminishing importance of certain secular and Kemalist elements. Erdoğan himself defended the goal of raising a generation with national and religious values.

When this policy is compared with Atatürk’s philosophy, interpreting his words becomes almost unnecessary. The contradiction is evident.

Atatürk sought to organize education, the state, and the legal system around reason, science, and modern principles, and he made secularism one of the cornerstones of the republic. The Atatürk Research Center explains that, within the Kemalist understanding, education was expected to be based on secular, rational, and modern principles.

Erdoğan, on the other hand, has moved Turkey toward a different definition of national identity, one in which Islam, Ottomanism, and religious conservatism play a more prominent role.

This is no longer about whether someone likes Atatürk or not.

The debate revolves around whether the republic should remain the same Kemalist republic or, while preserving Atatürk’s name, be transformed into a different republic with a different identity.

This is why Hagia Sophia also matters.

When the status of Hagia Sophia was changed in 2020 and it was reconverted into a mosque, the issue was not merely about the building’s function. Hagia Sophia is one of the most important symbols of the conflict between the Ottoman legacy and the secular republic. For Erdoğan’s supporters, the decision represented the restoration of a historic symbol to its Islamic status; for his critics, it was another indication that Turkey was moving away from part of the legacy of the secular republic.

These are precisely the kinds of policies to which Atatürk, if he were alive today, would hardly have remained indifferent.

Not because he personally owned Hagia Sophia, but because his entire republican project was based on redefining the relationship between the state, religion, and society.

Atatürk also spoke sharply about political movements that incorporated religion into partisan struggles. He regarded the experiences of the Progressive Republican Party as an example of the dangers of using religion as a political instrument and warned that political objectives could be concealed behind religious slogans.

This part of history is particularly important when comparing him with Erdoğan, because Erdoğan, throughout his political career, has also repeatedly used religious language for social and political mobilization.

Of course, this does not mean that Erdoğan can be directly compared with the leaders of the 1920s, or that today’s Turkey is the same Turkey of that era. Such a comparison would be superficial.

But one thing cannot be denied:

Atatürk wanted religion to be separated from the instruments of political power; Erdoğan has linked politics much more closely with the religious identity of society.

These are not the same paths.

This difference can also be seen in the concept of independence. Atatürk did not understand independence merely as the removal of foreign forces from Turkish territory. In his formal definition, political, financial, economic, legal, military, and cultural independence were all equally important.

From this perspective, Atatürk viewed the republic as a network of institutions, rather than simply as the concentration of power in the hands of one individual.

Erdoğan, however, during his time in power, particularly after Turkey’s transition to the presidential system, significantly expanded the powers of the presidency. This is not merely about Erdoğan himself; it is also a structural issue in which the president has assumed a much greater role than before.

Today, this issue plays an important role in the government’s confrontation with political opponents. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is the party founded by Atatürk. In recent years, legal and political pressure on the party and its key figures has intensified. In 2026, the leadership crisis within the Republican People’s Party even resulted in a court ruling that returned Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to the leadership of the party—an action that has placed Erdoğan and his government in one of the most serious political confrontations with the opposition in recent years. The Turkish government denies any political motivation and insists on the independence of the judiciary, while opponents argue that these actions are politically motivated.

The real meaning of this article’s title lies here.

If Atatürk were alive today, we cannot speak on his behalf. But we can place the principles he established for the republic alongside Erdoğan’s record.

What did Atatürk say about secularism?
Religion should not be a tool of politics.

What did Erdoğan do?
He made the role of religion and religious identity much more prominent in public policy and Turkey’s social life.

What did Atatürk say about independence?
Independence should be political, economic, judicial, military, and cultural.

What path did Erdoğan’s Turkey take?
It concentrated presidential power and today his government is engaged with its political opponents in one of the most difficult periods of the modern republic’s history.

What did Atatürk say about national policy?
Turkey should not become trapped in dreams beyond its capabilities and actual needs; policy should be based on national interests and the country’s own capabilities.

What did Erdoğan do?
He transformed Turkey into a more active and interventionist regional power and based its foreign policy on regional influence and a broader use of both hard and soft power.

Do all these differences mean that Erdoğan has a personal hostility toward Atatürk?

No.

And here, we should be fair.

Erdoğan has not erased Atatürk from Turkey’s official history. He knows that Atatürk remains a national symbol for a large part of Turkish society. Therefore, the issue cannot be reduced to a simple statement such as, “Erdoğan hates Atatürk.”

History is much more complicated—and therefore much more political.

Erdoğan does not need to destroy Atatürk; he only needs to change the meaning of Atatürk’s legacy.

Atatürk can be praised at official ceremonies, his portrait can be displayed in government buildings, officials can visit his mausoleum, and at the same time, the meaning of secularism, the role of religion, structures of power, the education system, and the identity of the republic can all be redefined.

This is where symbolic respect and political loyalty become separated.

Perhaps the most important question Atatürk would ask Erdoğan, if he were alive today, would not be, “Why don’t you love me?” Such a question would be too personal.

The crucial question would be:

“What kind of republic has the republic I built become?”

And the answer cannot be found in official speeches.

Not in laying flowers.
Not in commemorative ceremonies.
Not in photographs.

The answer must be found in policy.

Because history, unlike politicians, forgets nothing.

Atatürk built a republic.

Erdoğan built a different Turkey.

These two Turkeys overlap in some respects, but on some of the most fundamental issues, they stand on opposite sides of a historic dividing line.

And perhaps that is precisely why Atatürk remains a problem for Erdoğan:

He cannot be erased, and his legacy cannot be left entirely unchanged.

Therefore, Erdoğan’s main struggle with Atatürk is not a struggle against one person.

It is a struggle over the meaning of the Republic of Turkey.

And that struggle is not over yet.